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VOLUME 35 OCTOBER 1982 NUMBER 5
Defensive Responses to Tender
Offers and the Williams Act's
Prohibition Against Manipulation
Elliott J. Weiss*
Increasingly, companies faced with takeover bids have begun to
employ highly sophisticated tactics to rebuff or promote tender offers.
A potential limit to the use of these defensive takeover tactics is sec-
tion 14(e) of the Williams Act, which prohibits manipulation in con-
nection with tender offers. Professor Weiss discusses the definition of
section 14(e) manipulation and whether an arrangement that signifi-
cantly obstructs the operation of a fair auction market for a target
company's shares fits that definition. He focuses on the Sixth Circuit's
recent decision in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. in which the court
applied a broad definition of manipulation and held that certain lock-
up arrangements favoring one of the bidders were prohibited under
section 14(e). Professor Weiss endorses the Marathon decision and
concludes that the broader definition of manipulation helps clarify
the difference between legitimate corporate behavior and actions that
serve primarily to provide unwarranted protection to target company
managers or unnecessary benefits to favored tender offerors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act1 provides: "It shall be un-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B.
Dartmouth 1961; LI.B. Yale 1964. The author wishes to express his appreciation to his col-
leagues, William Bratton and Stephen Kroll, for their numerous helpful comments on drafts
of this article.
1. The Williams Act is an investor-protection statute that grew out of a congressional
concern for the interests of corporate management whose businesses were likely takeover
targets. Piper v. Chris-Craft, Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977). It was enacted in 1968, and added
§ 13(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) (1976 & Supp. IV), and § 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f)
(1976) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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lawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender
offer ... ."2 In recent years target companies and tender offerors
have used increasingly sophisticated tactics to rebuff or promote
tender offers.3 The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co.,4 holding that certain lock-up 5 arrangements are
"manipulative acts" in violation of section 14(e), calls into question
the legality of many of these tactics.
This Article discusses whether arrangements designed to en-
sure the success of a favored bidder or simply to defeat an un-
wanted tender offer are "manipulative acts or practices" barred by
section 14(e).' It argues that the critical issue is whether an ar-
rangement significantly obstructs the operation of a fair auction
market for a target company's shares. The Article maintains that
recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 14(e) and
other antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws provide
substantial support for this approach to interpreting section 14(e).
The Article first discusses the definition of section 14(e) ma-
nipulation. The recent Marathon decision provides the basis for
this discussion. The Article then explores the implications of this
proposed definition in takeover situations in which bidders or
targets are employing tactics such as lock-ups, two-tier bids, asset
or stock sales, defensive acquisitions, and indemnification agree-
ments.The Article emphasizes Marathon because it is the first case
subsequent to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green to raise squarely
the question of whether section 14(e) bars only what might best be
termed classic market manipulation, such as simultaneous
purchases and sales of securities at different prices, or whether it
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
3. See Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REv. SEC. REG. 82 (1981); Na-
than, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Market Place,
13th ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13 (Practicing Law Inst. 1981). Fraidin and Franco discuss the
strategy underlying the use of lock-up arrangements: "[Lock-up] arrangements do not nec-
essarily insure the success of a transaction or prevent another bidder from successfully chal-
lenging it. Rather, a lock-up arrangement merely increases a bidder's likelihood of success
and creates barriers (which can generally be overcome) to a competing bidder." Fraidin &
Franco, supra, at 821.
4. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
5. A lock-up is a device that places one bidder in a competitively advantageous posi-
tion to ensure that a bidder's tender offer will succeed.
6. For an analysis of different types of arrangements, see infra text accompanying
notes 191-220.
7. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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prohibits certain other arrangements as well.8 Prior to Santa Fe,
two federal district courts had enjoined as manipulative defensive
arrangements employed in connection with tender offers, but both
courts based their conclusions on the notion that section 14(e) em-
bodies a federal fiduciary standard9 - a rationale that would not
appear to survive Sante Fe.10
In addition to discussing how courts should interpret section
14(e), and endorsing the result reached in Marathon,"' this Article
criticizes philosophically, if not as a matter of law, recent decisions
of the Second,' 2 Third,"3 and Seventh 4 Circuits rejecting state law
challenges to the utilization by target companies of various defen-
sive tactics to fend off unwelcome takeover bids. This Article also
enters the broader debate currently raging over the economic ef-
fects of tender offers and defensive arrangements employed against
those offers.1 5 Indeed, the Article strives to examine these issues
that usually are discussed in the context of economic theory and
state law doctrine, from the perspective of federal law. The Article
concludes that section 14(e)'s ban against manipulation provides a
8. "[Marathon ] stands, at least for the time being, as the most authoritative decision
available on the legality of target-granted lock-up devices .... Nathan, Novel Legal Ques-
tions Explored, Nat'l L.J., March 29, 1982, at 30.
9. See Applied Digital Data Systems v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
10. See Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,584 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (commenting on impact of Santa Fe and holding
fraudulent defensive scheme to be in violation of state law).
11. The Marathon decision has received much criticism. See, e.g., Marshall Field &
Co. v. Icahn, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(expressing doubt that Marathon is good law in Second Circuit). For a discussion of Mara-
thon, see Bialkin, Court Casts Cloud Over Option Tract in Takeovers, Legal Times of
Washington, Jan. 11, 1982, at 19; Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 5; and Herzel & Collins,
Limits on Takeover Defenses, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 25; Nathan, supra note 8. For an
analysis of the decision's implications, see, e.g., Fraidin & Franco, supra note 3; Hochman,
The Marathon Case, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 827 (1981); Hochman, A Hostile Tender Offer: Does
It Suspend Rules?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 29, 1981, at 25.
12. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
14. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
15. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1028 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HIv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Take-
over Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An
Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
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particularly constructive approach to distinguishing between legiti-
mate corporate behavior and actions that serve primarily to pro-
vide unwarranted protection to target company managers or un-
necessary benefits to favored tender offerors.
II. DEFINING SECTION 14(e) MANIPULATION
A. The Contest for Marathon
Marathon is a medium-size, primarily domestic, oil company.16
The company was an attractive takeover target largely because of
its extensive domestic crude oil reserves, including a forty-eight
percent interest in the Yates field in Texas, the largest oil field in
the continental United States.
7
On October 30, 1981, Mobil, a large multinational oil com-
pany"' that traditionally has suffered from a shortage of crude oil
reserves, announced a cash tender offer of $85 per share for up to
forty million shares of Marathon common stock, or just over two-
thirds of the 58,685,906 Marathon shares issued and outstanding.
Mobil also stated its intention to acquire the balance of Marathon
in a merger if the tender offer was successful. The Marathon board
of directors concluded that Mobil's $85 per share was "grossly in-
adequate from a financial point of view," and that the tender offer
and proposed merger presented antitrust problems.1' Conse-
quently, the board decided to oppose the offer and filed an anti-
trust suit alleging that a merger between Mobil and Marathon
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 0 The Marathon board
16. Marathon had total sales of $8 billion and net income of $379 million in 1980. By
comparison, Exxon, the largest industrial company in the world, had total sales of $103
billion and net income of $5.65 billion. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 380
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
17. The Yates field has produced oil for more than fifty years and petroleum engineers
expect the field to continue producing for another ninety years. Marathon's 48% interest in
the oil field is the largest interest held by any oil company. The Marathon court appropri-
ately referred to it as Marathon's "crown jewel." Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d
366, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1981).
18. Mobil is the second largest industrial company in the world with sales at $63.7
billion and net income of $3.27 billion. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 380
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 149 (1982).
19. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder ] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) V 98,375, at 92,262 (S.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV). Section 7 provides in part as follows: "No person
... shall acquire ... stock ... where in any line of commerce ... in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." Id. (Supp. IV).
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also directed its investment banker to locate a "white knight"2 1-a
more attractive merger partner-prepared to pay a higher price for
Marathon.
Marathon's defensive tactics were successful. A United States
district court, acting on the antitrust claim, issued first a tempo-
rary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction barring
Mobil from consummating the purchase of any Marathon shares.22
Marathon's investment banker located three potential white
knights, and Marathon entered into negotiations with all three.
These negotiations culminated on November 18, 1981, when
United States Steel Corporation (USS) made a four-part package
offer to Marathon which it required Marathon to accept or reject
that day. USS offered to make a cash tender offer of $125 per
share for 30 million shares of Marathon stock, which represented
fifty-one percent of the outstanding shares, and to acquire the re-
mainder of Marathon in a subsequent merger in which USS would
issue a debenture with an estimated market value of $80 to $85 for
each share of Marathon stock. USS conditioned its offer on Mara-
thon's granting two options to USS-an irrevocable option to
purchase 10 million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon
common stock for $90 per share and an option, exercisable only if
the USS tender offer failed and a third party gained control of
Marathon, to purchase Marathon's forty-eight percent interest in
the Yates oil field for $2.8 billion.23
The Marathon board of directors, "faced with a difficult deci-
sion and little time in which to make it," 4 concluded that the USS
tender and merger offers were superior to the still-pending offers
by Mobil. The directors also determined that the exercise price of
the stock option, which was higher than Mobil's offer and the
then-current trading price of Marathon stock, was fair to Mara-
thon shareholders and that the exercise price of the Yates field op-
tion was reasonable.25 Consequently, rather than run the risk of
allowing the USS offer to expire, the directors voted unanimously,
with two absentees, to accept USS's offer and to grant USS the
21. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 368 (6th Cir. 1981).
22. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd 669 F.2d 378
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
23. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 367.
24. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,375, at 92,268 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.




two options.2" Marathon and USS executed the merger and the
stock option and Yates field option agreements before the end of
the day.
Mobil filed suit shortly thereafter to enjoin the USS tender
offer, the stock option, and the Yates field option on the grounds
that USS, Marathon, and Marathon's directors had acted in viola-
tion of section 14(e) of the Williams Act and various provisions of
Ohio law." Mobil also raised its cash tender offer bid to $126 per
share for up to thirty million shares of Marathon and stated that if
its offer were successful, it would acquire the remainder of Mara-
thon through a merger in which it would issue Mobil debentures
with a value of $90 for each remaining Marathon share.2 8 Mobil,
however, conditioned its revised offer upon the cancellation or ju-
dicial invalidation of the stock option and the Yates field option.2 '
The district court denied Mobil's request for a preliminary in-
junction. 0 The court found that USS and Marathon had not en-
gaged in deception, and that Mobil's contention that the grant of
the stock option and the Yates field option was fraudulent or ma-
nipulative failed to state a cause of action under section 14(e).31 To
support this latter holding, the court relied on the statement in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green3 2 that "'once full and fair dis-
closure has occurred, fairness of the terms of the transaction is at
most a tangential concern of the statute.' "3 The Court held Mo-
bil's claim was simply that the terms of the options were unfair.3 4
The court also rejected Mobil's state law claims, including the
allegation that the Marathon directors had breached their fiduci-
ary duty to Marathon by granting USS the stock and Yates field
options.3 5 The court held that the directors had met their burden
26. Id.
27. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 368. Mobil contended that the agree-
ment by the Marathon board to the USS offer constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, that
the agreement violated the Ohio requirement that shareholders approve the sale of substan-
tially all of a corporation's assets, and that the grant of the options served no corporate
purpose. Id.
28. Id. at 369.
29. Id.
30. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,375 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
31. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 370.
32. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See infra notes 108-50 and accompanying text.
33. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) at 92,282 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977)).
34. Id. at 92,281.
35. See supra note 27. The court held that Marathon's directors had the burden of
1092 [Vol. 35:1087
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of proving "that both options were fair with respect to their valua-
tion. '3 6 Moreover, the court found that the grant of the options
served the "reasonable corporate purpose" of obtaining "the best
possible deal for Marathon shareholders in the face of an inevita-
ble takeover. 3 7 Thus, the court concluded that the defendant di-
rectors had "borne their burden of showing fairness, corporate pur-
pose, and good faith."38
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed.3 9 The court addressed
only Mobil's claim that the Yates field option violated section
14(e). It concluded that the two options individually and collec-
tively were manipulative. °
The court's argument in support of its conclusion was as fol-
lows. First, manipulation, as defined by the Supreme Court, con-
cerns "affecting. .. the market for, or price of, securities by artifi-
cial means, i.e., means unrelated to the natural forces of supply
and demand. ' 4 1 Second, lock-up options of the type granted to
USS "not only artificially affect, but for all practical purposes com-
pletely block, normal healthy market activity .... " Mobil had
shown that the two options created an artificial price ceiling in the
tender offer market for Marathon common share.4 s Specifically, the
Yates field option served only "to deter ... other potential tender
offerors from competing with USS in an auction for control of
proving the options were fair since the directors were perpetuating themselves in office by
granting the options. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,281. In reaching this conclusion the district court seemed to reject
implicitly the Seventh Circuit's argument in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1981), that the interest of outside directors of a target corporation in perpetuating
their control is not sufficient to remove decisions which have that effect from the coverage of
the business judgment rule. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. Panter is distin-
guishable on the ground that a majority of the Marshall Field directors were outsiders, while
half of the Marathon directors were insiders. The district court, however, did not articulate
this distinction.




39. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1490 (1982).
40. Id. at 374. The court sua sponte raised and analyzed the issue whether, in light of
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), see infra notes 179-189 and accompanying
text, Mobil had standing to maintain an implied cause of action to enforce section 14(e). See
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 370-73.
41. 669 F.2d at 374 (emphasis in original) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 375.
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Marathon. . .. [T]he stock option was large enough.., to serve
as an artificial and significant deterrent to competitive bidding for
a controlling block of Marathon share."' 44 Since "[t]he purpose of
the Williams Act, protection of target shareholders, requires that
Mobil and any other interested bidder be permitted an equal op-
portunity to compete in the marketplace and persuade the Mara-
thon shareholders to sell their shares to them, '45 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the two options should be cancelled and that USS
should keep its bid open for a reasonable time to allow Mobil and
other potential offerors to bid for Marathon shares in a market
free of the effects of USS's manipulative conduct.4"The court ex-
pressly noted that it was not disturbing "the district court's find-
ing of good faith and loyalty by the Marathon directors.' 47 The
court directed its mandate concerning relief at USS for "demand-
ing and obtaining the options, as well as any manipulative conduct
by the Marathon directors.' 8 "The Williams Act protects the tar-
get shareholders regardless of who did the manipulating.""14
The Sixth Circuit clearly was correct in concluding that USS,
by receiving the two options, was in a preferred position to com-
pete for control of Marathon, and that consequently the potential
for competitive bidding for Marathon was reduced significantly.
Since USS possessed the Yates field option, it was the only bidder
that could acquire Marathon complete with its Yates field interest.
Moreover, the conditional nature of the option-it was exercisable
only if USS did not succeed in its tender offer and some other per-
son obtained control of Marathon-indicates that the purpose of
the option was the deterrence of competing bids. Similarly, the
44. Id. USS viewed the options as a means of gaining an advantage in the contest for
Marathon rather than as serving some essential independent business purpose, since USS
stated in its tender offer that the offer was not conditioned on the options' validity. See
Appellant's Brief at 41, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
45. 669 F.2d at 376.
46. On the same day the Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court in Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982), which blocked the
proposed acquisition by Mobil on antitrust grounds. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982). Thus, Mobil was unable to
reenter the contest for Marathon despite prevailing on the Williams Act claim. Judge Mer-
ritt, who authored the decision, dissented in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. on the ground
that, in light of the court's disposition of the antitrust case, Mobil's Williams Act claims
were moot. 669 F.2d at 378 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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stock option gave USS a significant advantage in a contest for con-
trol of Marathon without serving any other legitimate purpose. If
USS succeeded in its tender offer, and subsequently acquired the
remainder of Marathon, it would have no need for the option nor
any reason to exercise it. USS would exercise the option only if
another bidder entered the contest for Marathon. Consider the sit-
uation in which a second bidder wanted to acquire a fifty-one per-
cent interest in Marathon for $125 per share-the amount bid by
USS. With the option USS could obtain a fifty-one percent inter-
est by spending $4.025 billion-$90 per share for the ten million
optioned shares and $125 each for an additional twenty-five mil-
lion shares. The competing bidder, however, must spend $4.375
billion-$125 per share for 35 million shares or $350 million which
is 8.7% more to obtain a fifty-one percent interest.50 In addition,
USS's advantage would increase, in both absolute and relative
terms, with each increase in the bid price. For example, if bidding
reached the $140 per share level, USS could obtain control of Mar-
athon for $4.4 billion, while a competitor would have to pay $4.9
billion, which is $500 million, or 11.4%, more.51
B. Interpreting Section 14(e)
The critical issue addressed in Marathon was whether ar-
rangements such as the two options granted by Marathon to USS
are "manipulative acts or practices" within the meaning of section
14(e). The Marathon court dealt with this issue by analyzing how
the options affected the tender offer market for Marathon shares.
Consideration of the relevant statutory language, the purposes of
the Williams Act, and the policy considerations discussed by the
Supreme Court in Santa Fe, however, is necessary to determine
whether the result reached in Marathon was correct.
50. In a contest for control a competitive bidder would have to assume that USS
would exercise its option. Consequently, the number of shares representing a 51% interest
in Marathon would increase from approximately 30 million to approximately 35 million.
51. Viewed from a different perspective, if a competitor was prepared to pay $4.9 bil-
lion for a 51% interest in Marathon, and USS was prepared to pay only $4.65 billion, USS
would still prevail in a bidding contest. The competitor would be prepared to pay no more
than $140 per share for the 35 million shares it would need. USS, on the other hand, could
purchase 10 million shares for $900 million, and could then afford to pay up to $150 per
share for an additional 25 million shares while still remaining within its lower overall price
ceiling.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
1. The Statutory Language
Although the Supreme Court never has dealt with the prohibi-
tion against "manipulative acts or practices" in section 14(e), the
Court recently discussed the meaning of "manipulation" in section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder52 considered whether the language of sec-
tion 10(b) suggests that scienter is a necessary element of a private
cause of action for damages implied under that section. The Court
stated that manipulation "is and was virtually a term of art when
used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities." 3 In Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 4 the Court expanded on its view of
manipulation: "The term [manipulation] refers generally to prac-
tices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity.
'55
Neither Ernst & Ernst nor Santa Fe is dispositive of what
constitutes manipulation for purposes of section 14(e). The Court's
statements in these cases do not make clear whether deception is a
necessary element of a manipulative act or practice or whether ar-
tificial impact on market activity is the sole critical indicium of
manipulation. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Cargill, Inc. v. Har-
din56 is instructive in attempting to resolve this ambiguity. Cargill,
which was brought under the Commodity Exchange Act, is one of
the few cases decided prior to Marathon to turn on the question of
how a court should interpret a statutory prohibition against ma-
nipulation.5 7 The Cargill court reviewed the definitions of manipu-
lation utilized by courts in other contexts e.5 The court noted that
courts consistently have defined manipulation in a practical man-
ner designed to accomplish the objectives of the statute in ques-
52. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
53. Id. at 199. The Court said that this connotation of intent or willfulness supported
the view that scienter was a necessary element of a cause of action under section 10(b). Id.
at 201.
54. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
55. Id. at 476.
56. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
57. The issue in Cargill was whether "manipulation under the Commodity Exchange
Act must include the commission of an 'uneconomic act.'" 452 F.2d at 1163. The court




tion.59 Although "[t]he methods and techniques of manipulation
are limited only by the ingenuity of man,"60 the court concluded
that the conduct which courts have held to be manipulative has
had two essential characteristics: (1) the conduct has been inten-
tional, and (2) the conduct has resulted in a price "which does not
reflect basic forces of supply and demand."6 1 Thus, Cargill sug-
gests that the critical component of manipulation is artificial im-
pact on market activity and that a manipulative scheme does not
necessarily depend upon deception. Congress' use of the disjunc-
tive in section 14(e), which bars "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative acts or practices," 6 also suggests that "deceptive" acts and
"manipulative" acts are different kinds of behavior. Moreover, the
statement of the Santa Fe Court that "nondisclosure is usually
essential to the success of a manipulative scheme"6 3 implies recog-
nition that some manipulative schemes do not involve deception."4
A more important reason why the statements concerning ma-
nipulation in Ernst & Ernst and Santa Fe do not determine what
constitutes manipulation for purposes of section 14(e) is the con-
text in which those cases arose-alleged violations of section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) is part of a statutory scheme for the
regulation of securities trading. By contrast, section 14(e) of the
Williams Act is directed specifically at the regulation of tender of-
fers. The Ernst & Ernst Court itself stated that both the legisla-
tive history and the statutory context of a particular measure must
be considered when interpreting statutory language. 5 The Su-
preme Court has noted repeatedly that similar or identical words
in different federal securities statutes may properly be interpreted
to have different meanings if the history of the legislation in ques-
tion and the statutory context so require. For example, the Court,
when considering the meaning of the terms "purchase" and "sale"
in section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,66 has stated that "[w]here alterna-
tive constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms




62. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
63. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1976) (emphasis added); see
supra text accompanying note 55.
64. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (manipulation con-
cerns conduct designed to "deceive or defraud investors") (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 200-01.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
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purpose . "67 Utilizing this purpose-oriented approach to statu-
tory construction, the Court has concluded that an exchange of
stock pursuant to a merger agreement does not constitute a "sale"
in a section 16(b) case, 8 even though four years earlier, in a case
brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Court had held an
exchange of stock pursuant to a merger agreement to constitute a
"purchase or sale." 69
Thus, two conclusions relevant to a definition of manipulation
derive from the language of section 14(e). First, an approach to
defining "manipulative acts or practices" that stresses artificial im-
pact on market activity is more consistent with previous judicial
definitions of manipulation than an approach that requires proof
of deception. Second, the correctness of an artificial impact or mar-
ket activity approach turns less on the language of the stat-
ute-which clearly is amenable to a number of interpreta-
tions-and more upon whether that approach advances the
purposes of the Williams Act.
2. The Purpose of the Williams Act
Both the Williams Act and the 1934 Act share the goal of in-
vestor protection, but the Williams Act provides protection in a
specialized context. The 1934 Act is directed at investors in trading
markets; the Williams Act is concerned only with the impact of
67. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595 (1973)
(quoting Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972)).
68. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 600 (1973).
69. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (interpretation consistent
with purposes of § 10(b), even though Court acknowledged that under "no sale doctrine" of
SEC Rule 133, transaction would not have constituted "sale" for purposes of 1933 Act).
In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) one issue was whether the SEC is required to
prove scienter in an action to enjoin a violation of § 10(b). The Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) had held that scienter was a necessary element of a private
action for damages under § 10(b). See supra note 53 and accompanying text. In SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) the Supreme Court held that scienter is
not a necessary element of an action brought by the SEC to enjoin an alleged violation of §
206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), which bans any act
or practice of an investment adviser that "operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client." Id. § 80b-6(2). The Aaron Court reconciled these two seemingly conflict-
ing decisions by noting that the two different statutory schemes served different purposes.
Proof of scienter is consistent with the purpose of § 10(b), which is to bar fraudulent trans-
actions in securities markets, but does not advance the objectives of the Investment Advis-
ers Act, which establishes a fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and their
clients. Since Aaron concerned enforcement of § 10(b), the Court concluded that Ernst &
Ernst's interpretation of the meaning and purpose of § 10(b) was controlling. Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).
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tender offers on investors. Thus, the Supreme Court in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries70 stated: "The legislative history thus shows
that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of
investors who are confronted with a tender offer."
7 1
Moreover, Congress used different means in the two acts to
effectuate their different investor protection goals. The 1934 Act
protects investors by regulating trading markets,7 2 requiring disclo-
sure, 7  and prohibiting deception and classic kinds of market ma-
nipulation .7 The Williams Act employs a three-pronged approach
to protect investors. First, tender offerors are required to make ex-
tensive disclosures about themselves, the source of their financing,
and their plans for the target company. 5 Second, the Williams Act
provides specific substantive benefits to tendering shareholders, in-
cluding rights to withdraw tendered shares, to participate pro rata
in offers for less than all of a company's shares, and to receive the
highest price that a tender offeror pays for a target company's
shares .7  Last, although the Williams Act identifies no specific ar-
rangements as deceptive or manipulative, all "fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative acts or practices" are prohibited, not just in
connection with purchases and sales of securities,77 but "in connec-
tion with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation.1
7
No provision of the Williams Act explicitly characterizes lock-
up options or other specific practices as manipulative. Addition-
ally, no specific discussion of what arrangements are manipulative
under section 14(e) exists in the legislative history. This is not sur-
prising. When Congress adopted the Williams Act, it was con-
cerned primarily with tender offerors' high-pressure tactics.79
70. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
71. Id. at 35.
72. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §9 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 19, 15 U.S.C. §
78(0, (g), (h), (k), (o), (q), (s) (1976).
73. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9§ 12-13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(l)-(m) (1976).
74. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §9 9, 10, 15 U.S.C. 99 78(i), () (1976).
75. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1976).
76. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 23 (1977).
77. Section 10(b)'s prohibition against manipulation supplements the specific prohibi-
tions against identified manipulative practices included in 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976). In addi-
tion, § 10(b) regulates conduct only in connection with purchases and sales of securities. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Court in Piper characterized § 14(e) as additive to
the disclosure and substantive provisions of the Williams Act. 430 U.S. at 24.
79. See, e.g., 113 CoNG. REc. 857-58 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel, cosponsor of
10991982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Neither offerors nor target companies had begun to use the sophis-
ticated tactics that have since become common in takeover bat-
tles.80 Consequently, Congress realistically could not have foreseen
the wide utilization of lock-ups and other defensive tactics that did
not appear until many years after the adoption of the Williams
Act. Nevertheless, a close reading of the Williams Act, along with a
review of the legislative purpose and testimony before Congress
during the consideration of the measure,8' strongly indicates that
the section 14(e) prohibition on manipulative acts should apply to
any arrangements that artificially impair the tender offer market
for a company's shares.
a. The Benefits of a Fair Auction Market
Protecting the rights of all potential bidders to compete on
equal terms in the market for a target company's shares advances
the purposes of the Williams Act. Maintenance of open competi-
tion in the auction market clearly benefits target company share-
holders by ensuring that they receive the best possible price for
their shares. "[A] rule of auctioneering increases premiums [paid
to target shareholders] in all acquisitions, unfriendly or negotiated,
through merger or takeover, whether management is loyal or self-
serving.
'82
The Seventh Circuit in MITE Corp. v. Dixon s recently relied
upon a similar rationale in striking down the Illinois antitakeover
statute.84 The court concluded that the Illinois statute was uncon-
stitutional because it provided target company management with a
weapon against takeover bids and thus, upset the balance estab-
bill).
80. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1967, at 135 contains the most comprehensive catalog of offensive and defensive tactics used
in connection with tender offers during the years before the Williams Act was passed. The
only practice that the authors characterized as manipulative was the open market purchase
by a target company of its shares to raise their price above the amount bid by the tender
offeror. Id. at 145.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 90-102.
82. Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 1045. Bebchuk adds that a rule protecting target man-
agement's ability to act as an auctioneer promotes the interests of the shareholders and
society if management also is denied the power to obstruct bids it does not favor. Id. at
1054. Cf. Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,733, at
93,700 (2d Cir. June 30, 1982) (noting that under ordinary circumstances a tender offer does
not "freeze" the price of target company stock because other market participants are free to
top the original tender offer).
83. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629
(1982).
84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2 §§ 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
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lished by the Williams Act. Noting the strong link between Con-
gress' concern for protecting investors who face tender offers and
the preservation of a competitive and unimpeded auction market
for target company shares, the Seventh Circuit concluded: "[M
]aintenance of an equitable balance between the contending sides
is perceived as a principal means of investor protection. . .. [I ]n
its concern for investors, Congress was necessarily committed to
maintaining, where appropriate, the basic capability of offerors to
make successful tender offers .... 1,85
On appeal, the Supreme Court supported this characteriza-
tion.88 Justice White, writing for a plurality of the Court, stated:
[I ]t is ... crystal clear that a major aspect of the [Williams Act's] effort to
protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
bidder .... We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress
sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any
undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice.
8
7
Similarly, in the portion of his opinion in which he spoke for a
majority of the Court, Justice White noted the three detrimental
effects of the Illinois act. First, the Illinois statute deprived share-
holders of an opportunity to sell their shares at a premium.8 8 Sec-
ond, the statute hindered the efficient allocation of economic re-
sources.89 Last, the statute reduced the incentive of management
to perform well.90 The Court, Justice White continued, was unpre-
pared to disagree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "the
possible benefits of the potential delays required by the [Illinois ]
Act may be outweighed by the increased risk that the tender offer
will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent manage-
ment."91 Because the statute imposed these substantial burdens on
interstate commerce, and created only limited local benefits, it was
85. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 496. See also Kennecott v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181,
189-90(3d Cir. 1980)(holding New Jersey takeover law unconstitutional for similar reasons).
86. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
87. Id. at 2636-37 (emphasis added). Justice White also noted that Congress did not
intend to discourage takeover bids. Id. at 2636. Shareholders often receive a premium over
the market price because of competitive bidding for their shares. Id. at 2636 n.9. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined this portion of Justice White's opinion, which en-
dorsed the Seventh Circuit's supremacy clause rationale. Id. at 2633. Only Justice Stevens
expressed any explicit misgivings about this portion of Justice White's opinion. Id. at 2644.
(Stevens, J., concurring).






unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
b. Congressional Support of Shareholder Decisionmaking
The Williams Act reflects Congress' fundamental belief that
target company shareholders are capable of acting in their own in-
terests if they are provided with adequate information relevant to
a tender offer and given a reasonable period of time within which
to decide what to do.92 Prior to adoption of the Williams Act,
shareholders were "pawn[s] in a form of industrial warfare,"9 " vul-
nerable to tender offers designed to force them to decide quickly
whether to sell all or part of their shares, and to the self-serving
conduct of target company managements." Although Congress was
concerned primarily with the tactics of tender offerors, it nonethe-
less took pains to note that target company shareholders often
benefit from tender offers and that the bill "avoids tipping the bal-
ance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the
person making the takeover bid."9 5
The Supreme Court pointed out in Piper that Congress imple-
mented a "policy of neutrality"9 " to ensure that legitimate take-
over bids by offerors prepared to make full disclosure would not be
discouraged.9 7 A policy of neutrality does not necessarily subsume
a rule prohibiting one person from impeding another's access to
the tender offer market. This type of prohibition, however, is con-
92. At the hearings on the Bill SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen stated that the purpose
of the measure was "to provide the investor, the person who is required to make a decision,
an opportunity to examine and to assess the relevant factors and to reach a decision without
being pressured and without being subjected to unwarranted techniques which are designed
to prevent that from happening." Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership in Corpo-
rate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
93. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (quoting Hearings, supra note
92, at 17 (testimony of Manuel Cohen)).
94. Before the enactment of the Williams Act offerors could limit the time that an
offer would be available, require that tenders be irrevocable, or specify that if shareholders
oversubscribed the offer, then the offeror would purchase the first shares tendered. These
terms caused shareholders to tender quickly or risk losing the opportunity to realize the
tender offer price. For a discussion of tactics used by target managements, see Hayes &
Taussig, supra note 80.
95. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). See HousE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT ]; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING &
CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER
BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1967).




sistent with a policy of neutrality. A policy of neutrality and a pro-
hibition against impeding access to the tender offer market exist to
ensure that target shareholders are able to make informed choices.
The policy of neutrality achieves this objective by not favoring any
party in a tender offer situation. The prohibition against impeding
access to the tender offer market promotes an informed choice by
eliminating barriers to the presentation of the choice to
shareholders."
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Co.9 noted that the primary purpose of the Williams Act is to ad-
dress what the Senate committee had described as the "dilemma"
faced by target shareholders 00 One aspect of this dilemma is that
a shareholder facing a tender offer "may wait to see if a better
offer develops, but if he tenders late, he runs the risk that none of
his shares will be taken." 10 This situation represents a "dilemma"
only if one believes that a shareholder should have a reasonable
opportunity to receive and consider competing tender offers.
Judge Edward Weinfeld, in a recent decision denying a motion
by Conoco to enjoin one offeror, Seagram Co., from making a
tender offer for Conoco in competition with a tender offer from a
second offeror, Du Pont, articulated the philosophy underlying
congressional enactment of the Williams Act:
What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer controversies is that the
shareholders, not the directors, have the right of franchise with respect to
shares owned by them. . .. [T]he shareholders now have the choice of acting
upon the existing outstanding offers of Du Pont and Seagram .... The Di-
rectors are free to continue by proper legal means to express to the share-
holders their objection and hostility to the Seagram proposal, but they are
not free to deny them their right to pass upon this offer or any other offer for
the purchase of their shares. 02
98. Senator Harrison Williams, the principal sponsor of the legislation, outlined the
primary goal of the legislation: "The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of
Sen. Williams). See also supra note 92 (similar remarks of SEC Chairman Cohen).
In colloquy with Senator Jacob Javits, who asked if the Bill was intended to condemn
tender offers, since "[s]ometimes stockholders do very well because of tenders, especially
competitive tenders," 113 CONG. REc. 24,665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits), Senator Wil-
liams responded: "There is no intention ... to prohibit tender offers. As a matter of fact, I
think [the Bill] might encourage them," id. (remarks of Sen. Williams).
99. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id. at 58 n.8.
102. Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (making a




c. The Relevance of the Act's Substantive Provisions
The substantive provisions of the Williams Act dealing with
withdrawal rights and rights to receive the best price paid furnish
additional support for the view that courts should interpret section
14(e) to bar as manipulative any actions that significantly impede
participation by a potential bidder in the tender offer market for a
target company's shares. By regulating the conditions under which
a company may make a tender offer, the Williams Act provides
target shareholders with the opportunity to receive and evaluate
competitive bids. Thus, arrangements that limit competition sub-
vert the intent of Congress in enacting these provisions.
Section 14(d)(5) provides that for seven days after a tender
offer is made, tendering shareholders shall have the right to with-
draw shares they have tendered.110 The House committee report
explains that this provision "would give shareholders who tender
their shares immediately after the offer is made a short period
within which to reconsider." 10' A shareholder will reconsider his
decision to tender his shares to the original offeror in light of addi-
tional information provided by target company management or
others, or he will reevaluate his decision because another bidder
has made a more attractive offer for his shares. Given these pos-
sibilities, Congress' decision to grant withdrawal rights suggests a
desire to provide a target company shareholder with an opportu-
nity to accept the most attractive and timely offer.10 5
Section 14(d)(7),106 the best price provision, also ensures that
target shareholders receive the full benefit of free market competi-
tion for their shares. The provision benefits shareholders both
when an offeror increases his bid because it has not attracted the
desired number of shares-even when a shareholder was prepared
to accept a lower price-and when an offeror increases his bid to
compete with another offer. Under 14(d)(7) all shareholders have a
right to receive the price that is the product of supply and demand
in a competitive auction market. Allowing an offeror or a target
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
104. HousE REPORT, supra note 95, at 10.
105. SEC Regulation 14D provides that shareholders may withdraw shares for 15 busi-
ness days after an offer is made, and that if a competitive offer is made, these rights are
extended to 10 business days from the date of that offer, unless the shares already have
been purchased. This rule recognizes the value to target shareholders of being able to re-
ceive and consider competing offers. The rule does not promote competitive offers, but it
does ensure that shareholders have adequate time to consider them. SEC Act Release No.
33-6158.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
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company to limit competition would frustrate this objective.
In sum, both the legislative history and the structure of the
Williams Act demonstrate a congressional intent to ensure that
target company shareholders obtain the benefits generated by the
existence of an open and competitive auction market for their
shares. Although Congress did not consider explicitly all tactics
that would deprive shareholders of the benefits of that market, it
did enact a comprehensive antifraud provision in section 14(e).
"No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious
devices that might be used to manipulate . . . [the tender offer
market].' '1°7 Thus, the Sixth Circuit's holding that the options
granted by Marathon to USS were manipulative'"8 seems to be
consistent not only with the language of the Williams Act, but also
with the purposes that Congress intended the Williams Act to
serve, since those options placed USS in a preferred position to
compete for control of Marathon and were designed to discourage
other bidders. Indeed, if those options cannot be characterized as
manipulative, the door would be open to a variety of arrangements
to rig the tender offer market-a possibility that the Congress
which passed the Williams Act surely would not have endorsed.
3. The Relevance of Santa Fe
The Article so far does not consider the significance of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green.109 Several
commentators, along with the district court in Marathon, have
contended that Santa Fe precludes a holding that the options
granted to USS violated section 14(e)." 0 The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, summarily disposed of this argument, terming it "erroneous"
and adding only that "Santa Fe involved a claim under section
10(b)."' A fuller consideration of Santa Fe is required. Interpret-
ing section 14(e) to prohibit lock-ups and various other arrange-
ments may be compatible with the statutory language and advance
the purpose of the Williams Act, but section 14(e) could be defined
to prohibit only classic manipulative maneuvers-such as simulta-
neous purchases and sales of target company stock-without strip-
107. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (discussing § 10(b) of the
1934 Act prohibition against manipulation of securities prices).
108. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
109. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
110. See Bialkin, supra note 11, at 19; Herzel & Colling, supra note 11, at 25; Nathan,
supra note 8, at 25.
111. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 1981).
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ping the statutory language of all meaning. Thus, if Santa Fe sug-
gests that the term manipulative in section 14(e) should be defined
narrowly, then a restrictive approach probably is required.'1 2 In
that event, one also would conclude that the Sixth Circuit reached
an incorrect result in Marathon.
A close analysis reveals that Santa Fe does not require a re-
strictive interpretation of section 14(e). 111 The case arose when
Santa Fe Industries, which had acquired ninety-five percent of the
stock of Kirby Lumber, eliminated the remaining shareholders of
Kirby by effecting a short-form merger in compliance with the Del-
aware merger statute. Minority shareholders brought suit against
Santa Fe Industries, claiming that the merger was fraudulent and
manipulative, in violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC
rule 10b-5, because the merger was designed solely to eliminate the
minority shareholders of Kirby and was consummated at a grossly
inadequate price.114 The district court dismissed the complaint,
concluding that since defendants had made full and fair disclosure
to the minority shareholders, the merger transaction was beyond
the purview of rule lOb-5.1 6 The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that even without any misrepresentation or nondisclosure of rele-
vant facts, the defendants had violated rule 10b-5 if they had ef-
fected a merger without any corporate purpose at an inadequate
price. 1" 6
The case presented two questions to the Supreme Court:
whether an allegation of deception or manipulation was necessary
to a valid claim under rule 10b-5 and, if it was, whether defen-
dants' alleged conduct was deceptive or manipulative. The Court
answered the first question summarily, holding that section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 reach only conduct that is manipulative or decep-
tive. "'When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipula-
112. Indeed the Supreme Court in Santa Fe limited the definition of manipulation for
purposes of § 10(b) to this type of conduct. See supra text accompanying note 107. For an
example of such classic manipulation in the context of a tender offer, see Crane Co. v. West-
inghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
113. The policy considerations in part IV of Santa Fe seem to support the Court's
circumscription of the meaning of manipulation under § 10(b). See infra text accompanying
note 116.
114. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 467.
115. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part
and rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
116. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
Judge Mansfield, in a concurring opinion, argued that defendants' conduct was manipu-
lative under § 10(b). 533 F.2d at 1294 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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tion and deception,. . . and when its history reflects no more ex-
pansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the
statute .... , "117 Clearly, said the Court, defendants' conduct was
not deceptive since defendants had furnished the minority share-
holders with all relevant information.18
The Court also concluded that defendants' conduct was not
manipulative. But the Court supported this conclusion largely by
reiterating that the defendants' conduct should not be considered
manipulative because the term "manipulative" in section 10(b)
should not be interpreted to outlaw this kind of conduct. It stated:
[Manipulation I refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched or-
ders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity. . . .[W]e do not think Congress would have chosen
this "term of art" if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b) in-
stances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in which the essence of the
complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary. 119
The Court then set forth in part IV of its opinion policy considera-
tions to support its conclusions. 120 These policy considerations are
most relevant to the question of how the courts should interpret
section 14(e).
The Santa Fe Court's first policy consideration was that the
"fundamental purpose" of the 1934 Act is to implement a "philoso-
phy of full disclosure,"11 2 ' and not to ensure the fairness of any par-
ticular transaction. Thus, the Court was "reluctant to recognize a
cause of action... to serve what is 'at best a subsidiary purpose"
of the federal legislation.' 122 By contrast, the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act is to protect investors faced with a tender offer. The Wil-
liams Act attempts to achieve its objectives by a combination of
mandatory disclosure and substantive regulation. 2  As noted
above, prohibition of tactics such as lock-ups serves to protect in-
vestors' interests by promoting competition in the tender offer
market. 12 4 Thus, the prohibition serves the primary purpose of the
legislation.
The second consideration the Court relied upon in part IV of
Santa Fe was "whether 'the cause of action [is] one traditionally
117. 430 U.S. at 473 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976)).
118. 430 U.S. at 474.
119. Id. at 476-77.
120. Part IV immediately followed the discussion of manipulation.
121. 430 U.S. at 478. See supra text accompanying note 117.
122. 430 U.S. at 478.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 70-81.
124. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
1982] 1107
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1087
relegated to state law .. . ."125 In discussing the applicability of
state law the Court also noted that "the existence of a particular
state-law remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Con-
gress meant to provide a similar federal remedy .... "I'll This
point is significant because the argument thus far for holding lock-
up options and similar arrangements to be manipulative would ap-
pear equally applicable to a situation in which the management of
a target company, rather than a tender offeror, initiated the ar-
rangement. 27 The relationship of an offeror to target company
shareholders does not give rise to fiduciary duties,2 8 but state law
fiduciary principles regulate the relationship of the target's man-
agement to its shareholders. The mere existence, however, of a
state law cause of action, directed at an allegedly manipulative ar-
rangement, should not eliminate the possibility of a federal claim
directed at the same arrangement.12 9 The gravamen of a claim
under section 14(e) is manipulation, not mismanagement, and sim-
ply because the conduct at issue might constitute mismanagement
should not insulate the conduct from review under federal law.1
30
Santa Fe supports this conclusion. The Court relegated the
plaintiff in Santa Fe to his state court remedies because to uphold
a federal cause of action the Court would have had to override "es-
125. 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 60, 78 (1975)).
126. 430 U.S. at 478.
127. Managers of a target company should have no more latitude under federal law to
manipulate the tender offer market than a tender offeror. Thus, although the Marathon
court emphasized that USS had demanded the options, the court's rationale should apply
also to a grant of options by Marathon.
128. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Consequently, under state
law USS seemingly would be free to attach whatever conditions it wished to its offer to the
Marathon board, even if those conditions were designed to rig the tender offer market for
Marathon shares. See Bialkin, supra note 11, at 19 ("The 6th Circuit opinion, therefore,
stands for the novel proposition that. . . a party may not condition its willingness to offer
an increased bid by extracting some concession from the target designed to make it less
attractive to a competing bidder."). Id.
129. Since the options were of considerable value, Marathon's management could not
have given them to USS, if USS had been prepared to make its offer without receiving the
options. A gift of this kind would lack a legitimate business purpose and thus would be
prohibited.
130. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with securities transaction violates rule 10b-5 when the defendant effects
the transaction with material deception), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Cf. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 475 n.15. (citing with favor lower court decisions holding
the breaches of fiduciary duty which included deception constitute violations of rule 10b-5).
The violation of the federal interest in preventing deception or manipulation, not the breach
of fiduciary duty, gives rise to the federal cause of action.
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tablished state policies of corporate regulation." 13' Plaintiffs' claim
in Santa Fe was that defendants had violated section 10(b) and
SEC rule 10b-5 by effectuating a short-form merger, pursuant to
Delaware law, solely to eliminate minority shareholders at a grossly
inadequate price. The plaintiffs further claimed that the Delaware
appraisal statute, 32 which entitles dissatisfied minority sharehold-
ers to a judicial determination of the fair value of their shares, did
not provide them with an adequate remedy. To find a violation of
federal law, the Court would have had to agree that the state ap-
praisal remedy was inadequate. 33 If it did not agree, the plaintiffs'
federal claim would fail because the plaintiffs would not have been
damaged by the defendants' conduct.
The problems that acceptance of the plaintiffs' theory would
have created led the Court to reject it. "The reasoning behind a
holding that the . . . [Delaware appraisal statute did not provide
an adequate remedy ] could not be easily contained.' ' 3 4 This ap-
proach inevitably would draw federal courts into passing on the
adequacy of all state law regulation of corporate fiduciaries' in-
volvement in securities transactions. Eventually federal fiduciary
principles would emerge that would, to some extent at least, con-
flict with state fiduciary standards."3 5 This prospect led the Court
to conclude: "Absent a clear indication of Congressional intent, we
are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of cor-
porations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden." 136
Interpreting section 14(e) to bar lock-ups and other arrange-
ments that have similar effects would not cause comparable feder-
alism problems nor would it open the floodgates to federal usurpa-
tion of state regulation of corporate fiduciaries' behavior.137 The
court, in Marathon, based its finding of manipulation, for example,
not upon any perceived inadequacy in state law remedies available
to Mobil or to Marathon's shareholders, but on the manner in
which the two options impinged on the interest of Marathon's
131. 430 U.S. at 479.
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1980).
133. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304-09 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
134. 430 U.S. at 478.
135. Id. at 478-79.
136. Id. at 479.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 150-66.
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shareholders in the maintenance of an open auction market for
their shares.""s
Further, the Marathon court's declaration that the options
were manipulative would not have conflicted with or overridden
state law, even if the court had found that the Marathon directors,
in the exercise of their reasonable business judgment, had initiated
the offer to grant the options to USS. As the Santa Fe Court
noted, both federal and state regulation may concurrently govern
certain conduct."3 9 Concurrent regulation of the conduct of corpo-
rate officials in securities transactions is particularly common. The
federal courts consistently have interpreted the federal securities
laws in a manner designed to achieve their (federal) objectives,
even when a liberal interpretation would have the effect of limiting
the range of business judgments that corporate managers can
make. For example, the courts have not allowed corporate manag-
ers to justify decisions to issue false or misleading statements in
securities transactions on the grounds that those decisions were
reasonable business judgments. 40 Thus, if Marathon had given
material, nonpublic information to USS during their negotiations,
and if USS and Marathon then had agreed that they would not
disclose that information despite the USS tender offer for Mara-
thon shares, both USS and Marathon would be engaged in decep-
tive conduct in violation of sections 10(b) and 14(e). Although the
Marathon board's decision to keep the information secret might be
a reasonable business judgment, this finding would not be disposi-
tive of the federal securities law claims. Similarly, a board decision
to grant lock-up options to an offeror, though possibly a reasonable
business judgment, should not be immune to a claim of
manipulation.
Finally, the policy considerations espoused in part IV of
Santa Fe may be less pertinent to the interpretation of section
14(e) than to the interpretation of section 10(b) because of the di-
vergent purposes of the 1934 Act and the Williams Act. The Santa
Fe Court suggested it would have been more willing to impinge
138. 669 F.2d at 374-76.
139. See supra text accompanying note 134.
140. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980) ("A
company which undertakes to correct errors in reports presented to it for review. . . risks
sacrificing a measure of its autonomy. .. ."); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
863-64 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Of course, even if management
acted in a deceptive manner, management's good faith may be relevant to whether it acted
with scienter. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
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upon-or even override-state corporation law if Congress had in-
dicated some intent to preempt state law when it passed the 1934
Act."" Congress, according to the Court, limited the 1934 Act to
ensuring full disclosure. 142 The Williams Act, however, is not lim-
ited to disclosure and explicitly preempts state substantive law in
a number of respects.143 Moreover, the emphasis of the Williams
Act on protecting target company shareholders' ability to decide
how to respond to tender offers, although consistent with the ap-
proach that state courts once employed when dealing with contests
for corporate control, contrasts sharply with the approach to these
contests that state courts were using at the time of the adoption of
the Williams Act. Thus, federal courts may not need to be con-
cerned about interpreting the Williams Act in a manner that is
philosophically inconsistent with state law regulation of corporate
fiduciaries' behavior in contests for corporate control.
A brief review of leading cases reveals the trend of state law
regulation of contests for corporate control. The 1907 case of Elli-
ott v. Baker14 4 is illustrative of the approach state courts first used
when dealing with contests for control. In Elliott two factions were
contending for control of the Elliott Company. One faction, led by
Elliott, acquired a majority of the outstanding stock. The other,
led by Nickerson, controlled a majority of the directors. The Nick-
erson group, on learning of the threat the Elliott group posed to
their control, convened the board and approved the issuance of a
sufficient number of previously authorized shares to a friend of the
Nickerson group to ensure continued control of the board by the
group. Elliott brought suit to cancel these shares. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that issuance of stock to retain
control is "not a fair exercise in good faith of the power with which
[the directors] are clothed" and affirmed the cancellation of the
shares. 45 Although the directors may have believed that their ac-
tion was in the best interests of the corporation, the court stated
that a stock issuance absent convincing evidence that the company
needed to raise funds was invalid.146 Moreover, the court held that
141. The Court stated that the absence of any "clear indication" of contrary congres-
sional intent to override state law supported this conclusion. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. at 479.
142. Id. at 477-78.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
144. 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
145. Id. at 523, 80 N.E. at 452.
146. The court disregarded the minutes that the directors had drafted in advance of
the meeting in an attempt to justify their actions. The court focused instead upon the cir-
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a showing that the stock was sold for a fair price would not change
the result.4 7 Because of the contest for control, the board was obli-
gated to sell shares to the highest bidder rather than accepting a
price that would "ordinarily [be] a fair one, even if the com-
pany needed additional capital.
The courts gradually retreated from the shareholder-oriented,
market-oriented approach exemplified by Elliott. The court in
Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Screen Corp.19 held that directors
may use corporate resources to campaign for reelection in proxy
contests concerning questions of corporate policy.150 Similarly, the
First Circuit held that directors who face a challenge to their con-
trol may issue stock for any fair consideration if the sole or pri-
mary motive for issuing the stock is not protecting control.15' The
court in Kors v. Carey'52 upheld a directors' decision to repurchase
stock at a premium over the market price from a raider who
cumstances surrounding the sale of the stock and concluded that the primary motive under-
lying the sale was to ensure continued control of the board by the Nickerson group. Id. at
522, 80 N.E. at 451-52.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 522, 80 N.E. at 452. The court stated the price, "although ordinarily a fair
one, was not so much as could have been obtained if the directors had-taken advantage of
the contest for control of the corporation." Id. The directors' failure to obtain a higher price
called into question their good faith. The court in Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112,
94 N.W. 69 (1903) had reached a similar result four years earlier:
Nothing can be more fallacious in corporate or in popular government than the argu-
ment that because they honestly believe their policy right, and another dangerous, they
[the directors] may rightfully invade the field of suffrage upon which policy rests, and
disenfranchise, in whole or in part, those who disagree with them.
Id. at 124, 94 N.W. at 73.
149. 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934).
150. The court's reasoning in this case illustrates the process by which shareholders'
role in the corporate structure was diminished while the role of directors was enhanced. The
court equated directors' obligation to provide shareholders with information about transac-
tions that require both board and shareholder approval with directors' authority to use cor-
porate funds to urge shareholders to approve such transactions. Acknowledging the diffi-
culty of distinguishing proxy contests concerning issues of policy from contests concerning
only issues of personality, the court nevertheless extended its rationale and concluded that
directors also could use corporate funds to urge shareholders to reelect them in proxy con-
tests that involved questions of corporate policy. Id. at 84, 171 A. at 228.
151. McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). The court concluded
that the primary purpose of the challenged stock issuance was to provide an incentive for
employees, not to neutralize a raider. Id. at 394. The court in dicta, however, added that the
directors legitimately could have taken action directed at "frustrating a raid . . . ." Id. at
396. In the context of McPhail, the court's statement had some validity since the board
reasonably believed that the raider intended to manipulate the target company's affairs to
serve his personal ends. Id. at 394-95. The court's statement, however, was susceptible to
application in other contexts in which the interests of shareholders were not in jeopardy.
152. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960).
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threatened to change established corporate policies on the grounds
that the repurchase was authorized by law and served the useful
purpose of avoiding a costly proxy fight.
153
These decisions set the stage for Cheff v. Mathes, 15  a 1964
decision by the Delaware Supreme Court that is the most defini-
tive state court statement of directors' obligations when faced with
a threat to their control. In Cheff a shareholder of the Holland
Furnace Company challenged the repurchase by Holland of a large
block of its stock from Motor Products Company. Arnold
Maremont, who controlled Motor Products, had told Holland's di-
rectors that if Holland did not purchase his Holland stock at a
premium above the market price, he would seek control of Hol-
land.155 Noting that one effect of the repurchase was to protect the
Holland directors' control, the court held that the directors had
the burden of proving that the repurchase was "primarily in the
corporate interest. 1 56 In Cheff, however, the board that authorized
the repurchase had a majority of nonmanagement directors. The
court held that these "directors satisfy their burden by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be
penalized for an honest mistake of judgment. . . .- 7 In effect, the
court placed decisions that have the result of protecting incumbent
management's control, when made by outside directors, under the
protective umbrella of the business judgment rule.1 58 The court
abandoned the earlier view that contests for control should be de-
cided by shareholders acting in accord with market forces.
1 59
From this perspective, one can view the Williams Act as repre-
senting a congressional choice, not to eliminate target company
managements from any role in the tender offer process, but at least
153. The court relied upon Hall and McPhail to support this conclusion.
154. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
155. Id. at 501, 199 A.2d at 551.
156. Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554. The court relied upon an earlier ruling in Bennett v.
Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962) holding that directors must prove that
the terms of a defensive transaction are fair.
157. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
158. The decision afforded the directors the protection of what might be termed the
weak form of the business judgment rule-they were required to show good faith and rea-
sonable investigation. The strong form does not allow any challenge to a decision to which
any reasonable purpose can be attributed, unless a shareholder can show that the directors
had a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Schlensky v. Wrigley, 99 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776
(1968) (dismissing complaint which included allegations that challenged decision was moti-
vated by both controlling shareholder's idiosyncratic beliefs and directors' concern for long-
run economic interests of corporation).
159. See Gilson, supra note 15, at 824-31.
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to attempt to ensure that target company shareholders are in a
position to decide who will prevail in a tender offer contest. The
proposed approach to defining manipulation is consistent with that
choice.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO DEFINING
MANIPULATION
Federal court decisions that embrace the definition of manipu-
lation utilized by the Marathon court would have some exceed-
ingly important practical implications. Persons interested in chal-
lenging lock-ups and other defensive tactics that are employed in
tender offer battles likely would base their claims on section 14(e).
Moreover, parties challenging these tactics would be more likely to
prevail on their claims than they would if they brought suit under
state law since the proposed approach questions the lawfulness
under section 14(e) of several arrangements, in addition to lock-up
options, now being utilized to defend against hostile tender offers
or to promote the success of friendly offers.
A. Challenges Under Federal Law
In recent years, most parties challenging the defensive tactics
used by corporate management to defend against a hostile tender
offer have done so under state law.160 The decisions dealing with
these challenges are "something less than a seamless web,"16 but
the trend clearly has been in the direction of granting corporate
managers increasing lattitude to use corporate resources to resist
unwanted takeover bids. This trend was evident as early as 1969,
when a federal district court, in an opinion rejecting a challenge to
a defensive acquisition made by a target company, remarked:
"[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose [tender] offers
160. Management, however, frequently has challenged tender offers under § 14(e) by
characterizing them as deceptive.
161. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). For example, in
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967) Condec brought a
suit to cancel issuance of 75,000 shares of Lunkeheimer stock to a white knight. The court
held that Lunkenheimer's investigation of Condec was minimal and did not justify manage-
ment's resistance to a takeover, even though in Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d
548 (1964), see supra text accompanying notes 154-59, the court upheld the defendant di-
rectors' decision, which was based on a similarly cursory investigation. One possible basis for
distinguishing the two cases is that Condec was a suit for injunctive relief, not damages.
Delaware courts have been inclined to scrutinize management's decisions more closely in
suits for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); see also infra text accompanying notes 192-97.
1114 [Vol. 35:1087
DEFENSIVE RESPONSES
which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its
stockholders. ' 162 Three recent federal appellate decisions applying
state law highlight this movement. Taken together, these decisions
strongly suggest that plaintiffs in cases brought under state law
have minimal prospects of success.
In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.1"' a target corporation's direc-
tors issued stock to a white knight to eliminate the ability of an-
other offeror, which held about one-third of the target corpora-
tion's shares, to block a merger of the target company and the
white knight. The Second Circuit held that all but one of the tar-
get company's directors were entitled to the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule; since those directors would lose their director-
ships if the merger with the white knight were consummated, they
had no pecuniary interest in the defensive transaction."" The
court's reasoning implies that all decisions which favor white
knights will be insulated from close judicial scrutiny by the busi-
ness judgment rule if target company directors also expect to lose
their positions if a white knight prevails.
In Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc.1 6 5 Internorth made a
tender offer for Crouse-Hinds conditioned on the rejection by
Crouse-Hinds' shareholders of a previously announced merger be-
tween Crouse-Hinds and Belden, Inc. Crouse-Hinds and Belden
subsequently negotiated an exchange agreement, the sole function
of which appeared to be to pressure the Crouse-Hinds shareholders
into approving the Belden merger."66 Internorth sought to enjoin
162. Northwest Indus. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il1. 1969)
(dictum). The court concluded that the challenged defensive acquisition represented a rea-
sonable business decision by the target board. See Cummings v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964).
163. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
164. Id. at 383-84. The court failed to consider that one clear effect of the transaction
was to dilute the voting power in the target that the first offeror had acquired legitimately.
Compare id. at 383 n.48, with Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. -353, 230 A.2d
769 (1976). See supra note 161 and Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)
(disallowing change in annual meeting date that disadvantaged dissident shareholders, even
though change was accomplished in strict conformity with statutory requirements).
165. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
166. Id. at 695-97. Under the exchange agreement Belden shareholders received ex-
actly what they would have received in the merger. Thus, any Belden shareholder exchang-
ing shares presumably would have voted for the merger, so the agreement did not increase
the likelihood that the Belden shareholders would approve the merger. The Crouse-Hinds
shares received could not be voted at the Crouse-Hinds shareholders meeting on the merger.
Thus, the exchange agreement would not directly affect that vote. The exchange agreement,
however, included "standstill" provisions that made a vote against the merger economically
unattractive to Crouse-Hinds shareholders. Id. at 694.
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implementation of the exchange agreement. The Second Circuit
held that since the merger of Crouse-Hinds and Belden had been
announced before Internorth's tender offer, the Crouse-Hinds di-
rectors' decision to enter into the exchange agreement was moti-
vated by a desire to pursue the merger and not a desire to main-
tain their control of Crouse-Hinds. Consequently, the business
judgment rule protected that decision.167 In reaching this conclu-
sion the court ignored the fact that promoting the merger of
Crouse-Hinds and Belden effectively defeated the Internorth
tender offer. Crouse-Hinds exemplifies the increasing reluctance of
courts to overturn defensive transactions on state law grounds, ex-
cept when those transactions are motivated by a blatant desire to
protect control.168
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co. 169 upheld a district court's dismissal of claims that the direc-
tors of Marshall Field had approved a number of questionable ex-
pansions of Marshall Field's business primarily to create antitrust
obstacles to a tender offer that Carter Hawley Hale had announced
that it planned to make to acquire Marshall Field. Although the
rationale of the opinion is not clear, the court seemed to hold that
whenever some rational business purpose is attributable to nonem-
ployee directors' decisions that have the effect of protecting con-
trol, the courts will allow no further inquiry. The theory is that the
interests of outside directors in maintaining their directorships is
not sufficient, as a matter of law, to remove their decisions from
the protection of the business judgment rule.
1 70
The impact of these three decisions 11 upon the tender offer
167. Id. at 703-04.
168. Contrast the Second Circuit's willingness to embrace target managements' char-
acterizations of the facts in Treadway and Crouse-Hinds with the Massachusetts court's
skepticism in Elliott v. Baker, 114 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907), see supra note 142.
169. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
170. The dissent read the majority opinion in this fashion. See id. at 299-304 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting). The majority may have relied upon the language of Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964), see supra text accompanying note 123, and concluded
that the plaintiff had shown that a majority of the Marshall Field board had acted in good
faith and after reasonable inquiry. 646 F.2d at 293-98. If so, those directors would have met
the burden of justifying the defensive transactions being challenged.
171. A fourth recent federal appellate decision, Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287
(3d Cir. 1980), also has attracted considerable attention. The case concerned review of a
trial judge's charge to the jury regarding management actions that protect control. The
charge, based upon Delaware law, was ambiguous. The charge stated that the business judg-
ment rule did not apply when management had taken an action solely or primarily to pro-
tect control. The court, however, continued and said that the rule does apply if the direc-
tors' action "can be attributed to a rational business purpose." Id. at 292. This statement
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process is clear. Commentators and practitioners have read them
as endorsing use of ever more agressive and innovative defensive
tactics, 17 2 and instances of the use of these tactics have increased.
The suggested approach to interpreting section 14(e), as exem-
plified by the result in Marathon, implements the philosophy of
the Williams Act of protecting target shareholders' rights to sell
their shares in an open and competitive auction market, and repre-
sents a constructive counterweight to this trend. Professor Gilson
has argued convincingly: "The market for corporate control is the
principal constraint on management self-dealing in important situ-
ations, and the tender offer is the only displacement mechanism
which has the potential to effectuate that constraint . . . . Thus,
the corporate structure requires that tender offerors have un-
restricted access to target shareholders".
17 3
Further, the suggested approach to defining manipulation
likely will lead to more effective regulation of target company be-
havior than the state law standard recommended by Professor Gil-
son, which is that "no action shall be taken by the target company
which could interfere with the success of . . . [a tender] offer or
result in the shareholders of the target company being denied the
opportunity to tender their shares . ,'. ' A court attempting to
apply Professor Gilson's standard is apt to conclude that the stan-
dard cannot mean what it says. "The very fact that the director
wants to enhance corporate profits is in part attributable to his
desire to keep shareholders satisfied so they will not oust him.'
7
A director, however, surely is not barred from attempting to man-
age his corporation profitably because it has become the target of a
tender offer. Thus, the courts must distinguish between the actions
of directors that represent legitimate profit seeking and have the
incidental effect of interfering with a pending tender offer, and
those actions that are designed to defeat a tender offer. The courts
shifts the focus away from the directors' motives to possible justifications for their actions.
The plaintiff, however, did not attack the charge on this basis, but on the ground that an
action was improper whenever protecting control was "a" motive for directors' actions. Id.
The court correctly rejected this claim.
172. See, e.g., Fleischer, Tender Offers: Defenses, Responses, and Planning, 88-2 to
88-26; Lipton, Update, supra note 15. But cf. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294
(D. Del. 1981) (target company repurchase of its own stock probably improper under state
law, but injunction denied).
173. Gilson, supra note 15, at 844-45.
174. Id. at 879.
175. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292.
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likely will conclude that the test utilized in Cheff v. Mathes 76 pro-
vides the most convenient means for making this distinction, and
also furnishes a well-tested standard-the business judgment
rule-for evaluating the propriety of directorial actions that are
not directed primarily at protecting control.177 Indeed, one can en-
vision a court utilizing this line of reasoning when applying Profes-
sor Gilson's standard to a board's decisions in a situation identical
to that presented by Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., a case that
Professor Gilson clearly believes was decided wrongly,1 78 and
reaching a result identical to the one reached by the Seventh
Circuit.
The Article details below how the suggested approach to de-
fining manipulation would regulate defensive arrangements more
effectively. First, however, the Article considers questions relating
to standing and relief.
B. Standing and Relief
The Sixth Circuit in Marathon held that Mobil had standing
to maintain a private cause of action for injunctive relief under
section 14(e),'17 even though Mobil would not have had standing to
sue for damages under Piper, which held a defeated tender offeror
could not maintain a suit for damages under section 14(e).180 The
court supported this conclusion with pragmatic arguments relating
to the differences between suits for equitable relief and suits for
damages. 81 Piper provides some support for the Sixth Circuit's
176. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
177. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) in which the court ex-
plained why the Delaware courts have utilized a version of the business judgment rule to
evaluate the propriety of management actions taken in response to challenges to their con-
trol of a corporation. Id. at 292-93. Professor Gilson's defense of his proposed standard does
not address effectively this interpretive problem. See Gilson, supra note 15, at 881-82.
178. Gilson, supra note 15, at 830 n.43. One can envision a court reasoning that Mar-
shall Field's board merely made expansion decisions that were consistent with their desire
to manage Marshall Field properly, and that the business judgment rule protected those
decisions. That those decisions led Carter Hawley Hale to desist from making a tender offer
was merely an incidental, and legally irrelevant, consequence of this use by the board of its
inherent authority to manage the business. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 206-10.
179. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 370-73 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
180. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
181. In determining whether Mobil had an implied private cause of action under sec-
tion 14(e), the Court utilized the four-part test in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort
test consists of these factors: (1) whether plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted" (emphasis by the Court); (2) whether any indication exists
that the legislature intended-explicitly or implicitly-to create the remedy or to deny it;
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conclusion.182 Moreover, most lower federal courts are inclined to
allow tender offerors to maintain suits for equitable relief.183 In ad-
dition, target company shareholders probably can maintain suits
under section 14(e) for equitable relief and damages.8 ' Further-
more, the SEC has standing both to seek injunctions against viola-
tions of section 14(e),18 5 and to issue rules under section 14(e)
specifying that certain acts and practices are manipulative and,
hence, unlawful."86 Thus, if the proposed definition of manipula-
tion is adopted, parties with substantial relevant interests likely
will challenge most allegedly manipulative arrangements.
Courts should limit application of the Williams Act to suits in
which the plaintiff seeks equitable relief. Most arrangements that
constitute manipulation in connection with a tender offer take on
their manipulative character partly because they are overt-they
must be revealed to potential bidders to have their desired effect.
This characteristic makes equitable relief particularly appropriate
because if a court determines that an arrangement is manipulative,
it readily can remedy the situation by restoring the status quo
ante. 8
7
(3) whether the existence of a private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state
law. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
The Marathon Court found that under the Cart test Mobil had an implied cause of
action. In addition, the court also found four "special circumstances" in the case that justi-
fied Mobil's action: (1) Because the action was in the form of a preliminary injunction, the
case was at a stage when relief could best be given; (2) Mobil had large amounts of data
about Marathon; (3) Because the relief sought by Mobil was injunctive, the Court may
structure a remedy on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Mobil's tender offer is still outstanding
and the firm may renew its efforts to take over Marathon. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d at 372-73. The Court's summary of the "four special circumstances" relevant to the
standing issue is more persuasive than its analysis of the Cart elements.
182. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 42.
183. See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,483 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1982), aff'd sub noma. Whittaker v. Brunswick Corp., No.
82-1305 (7th Cir. 1982); LTV Corp. v. Grumann Corp., 526 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981); Weeks Dredging & Contracting,
Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American
Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
184. The analysis in Piper supports this conclusion. See 430 U.S. at 46. See also Mer-
rill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (defrauded inves-
tors can maintain an implied private cause of action for damages under the Commodity
Exchange Act).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976 & Supp. IV).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
187. For example, in Marathon the court required USS to keep its tender offer open
for a reasonable time after the two options were invalidated and to give Marathon share-
holders additional time in which to withdraw their shares and to tender them to another
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Further, allowing suits for damages could pose serious
problems. Lawyers representing target company shareholders-the
only persons who might have standing to sue for damages-might
delay bringing suit until after a manipulative arrangement has had
its desired effect, in the hope that the money damages available
would generate a larger fee than would a successful suit for equita-
ble relief.188 But courts may be tempted to alter their approach to
defining manipulation to avoid the prospect of draconian damage
awards against merely malfeasant directors. 189 The result could be
a body of law as doctrinally unsatisfactory as is the current body of
state law dealing with defensive tactics.
A possible solution is to deny target company shareholders an
implied cause of action for damages under section 14(e). Courts,
however, may find it difficult to distinguish satisfactorily between a
shareholder's right to sue for damages and a shareholder's right to
seek equitable relief.' A more promising approach would be one
that focused upon causation. The amount of damages caused by an
allegedly manipulative arrangement usually will be highly specula-
tive. Whether a manipulative arrangement deters anybody from
making a tender offer is often unclear. Moreover, would the offer
have succeeded-and at what price?' 9' Faced with such uncertain-
ties, the courts should decline to award damages in suits claiming
manipulation on the ground that plaintiff has not proven causa-
tion."9 2 The prospect of these rulings should dampen target com-
offeror if one appeared after the options were withdrawn. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d at 377-78.
188. Attorney's fees are available in suits for equitable relief, Bosch v. Meeker Coop.
Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W. 2d 423 (1960), but the "salvage value" theory
of awarding fees still tends to influence courts. See Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267 (1978). As a practical matter, attorneys
who frequently represent plaintiffs in derivative and class actions prefer to pursue suits that
potentially involve recovery of substantial damages.
189. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 7.06 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1982) "[A] close reading of cases, particularly those
involving outside directors, suggests that courts have protected directors from dispropor-
tionate liability through flexible interpretations of legal doctrines, such as proximate causa-
tion and negligence."); see supra note 168.
190. The sharply conflicting approaches taken by the majority and the four dissenting
Justices in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982), illus-
trate the doctrinal confusion in this area.
191. After the court in Marathon ruled that the two lock-up options were illegal, no
other bidders appeared and USS successfully completed its tender offer. See Radol v.
Thomas, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. [CCH] 98,693, at 93,454 (S.D. Ohio March 16, 1982). Mobil
could not pursue its tender offer because of the antitrust problems it raised. See supra note
46.
192. See Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945, 955-58 (S.D.N.Y.
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pany shareholders' interest in pursuing suits for damages and in-
crease the prospect that they will attempt to protect their interests
by seeking equitable relief.
C. A Taxonomy of Defensive Tactics
This Article has demonstrated that an act or practice intended
or designed to interfere with the operation of the forces of supply
and demand in the tender offer market is manipulative for pur-
poses of section 14(e).1 98 Arrangements have these effects when
they block a potential offeror or seller from entering the market or
when they place one offeror or seller in a preferred position vis-h-
vis all others. The Article also suggests that a federal court cannot
decide properly that an arrangement constitutes unlawful manipu-
lation under section 14(e) merely because the court deems the ar-
rangement to be unfair. The emphasis of Santa Fe upon the need
to avoid interpreting the federal securities laws in a fashion that
flatly overrides state law probably is as applicable to section 14(e)
as it is to section 10(b).
1 94
Only since Marathon have courts begun to analyze tender of-
fer arrangements regularly to determine whether they are manipu-
lative; predicting how they will react to specific fact situations in
the future is a venture fraught with peril. Nonetheless, litigated
cases furnish enough information about arrangements that have
1977), aff'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding Crane had not proven
that manipulative purchases and sales of target company stock had caused it any damage).
193. Intent is a critical component of manipulation. The Supreme Court stated in
Ernst & Ernst that use of the word "manipulative" in section 10(b) clearly evinces a con-
gressional intent to proscribe only "knowing or intentional misconduct." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197 (1976). This conclusion would appear to be equally applicable to
section 14(e). The Eighth Circuit concluded in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th
Cir. 1971) that courts consistently have found manipulative conduct was intended to affect
artificially market forces. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. Moreover, since a large
number of corporate decisions may have the effect of deterring one tender offeror or favor-
ing another, an intent test is needed to discriminate between the improper and the legiti-
mate activities of target companies. The courts are almost certain to read an intent test into
any standard proposed to regulate the activities of target companies during the pendency of
a tender offer.
194. Some commentators argue that the Williams Act creates a "federal fiduciary
principle" in the tender offer area. See, e.g., Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defen-
sive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 913 (1979). Several courts, however,
have held that target company management does not violate § 14(e) merely because it acts
for the purpose of protecting its position if its actions were not deceptive or manipulative.
See, e.g., In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bucher
v. Shumway [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,142 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
11, 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
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been utilized to allow an effort at classification of arrangements
and the reconciliation of decided cases.
1. Two-Tier Offers
A two-tier offer is a tender offer for a majority of a target com-
pany's shares at a substantial premium over the market price, ac-
companied by an agreement or statement of intent to acquire the
remainder of the target company in a second-step merger at a sig-
nificantly lower price.1 5 Tender offers are two-tiered in this fash-
ion to pressure target company shareholders into tendering their
shares, even when they may question the adequacy of the package
price or the tender offer price. By not tendering a shareholder risks
having all of his shares acquired at the lower, second-stage price. 196
Nonetheless, a court should not classify as manipulative a two-tier
offer, at least when target shareholders have the right to seek ap-
praisal of their shares or otherwise to challenge the second-step
merger under state law. A two-tier offer would be manipulative
only if state-law remedies are inadequate,1 7 and under Santa Fe a
federal court should not premise federal relief upon the unfairness
or inadequacy of state law.198
2. Defensive Acquisitions
An acquisition by a target company that creates a serious anti-
trust problem for a tender offeror constitutes an almost insur-
mountable barrier to consummation of a tender offer.199 To deter-
mine whether an acquisition by a target company is a manipulative
195. See Radol v. Thomas, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,693 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 16, 1982).
196. Since § 14(d)(6) requires offerors to accept pro rata only shares that are tendered
in the 10 days after an offer is made, use of this tactic places time pressure on target share-
holders. The offeror must keep the offer open for 20 business days pursuant to SEC rule
14e-2, but a shareholder who tenders after the first 10 days will not have any of his shares
accepted if the offer is oversubscribed during that period. The SEC has proposed that offer-
ors be required to accept pro rata all shares tendered during the withdrawal period to elimi-
nate this timing effect. Rel. No. 18761 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,222 (May 25,
1982).
197. If a state statute provides for a target shareholder to seek a fair price for his
shares, he can refuse to tender, or dissent from or sue to enjoin the second-step merger and
hope that a state court will agree that the price offered is inadequate. See Weiss, The Law
of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624 (1981). A claim by a
shareholder that a two-tier offer is manipulative, with these state remedies available to the
shareholder, requires a federal court to conclude that the remedies are inadequate.
198. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
199. See Fleischer, supra note 170, at 120 ("The most successful show stopper has
been the antitrust lawsuit alleging violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.").
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act or practice, a court should scrutinize the intent of the target
company. If the sole or compelling reason for the acquisition is to
block or frustrate a tender offer, then the acquisition is properly
classified as manipulative under section 14(e) and should be en-
joined. o Similarly, when a party utilizes an agreement ancillary to
an acquisition-such as the exchange agreement in Crouse-
Hinds201 -to usurp or interfere with shareholders' ability to evalu-
ate fairly a tender offer, that agreement should be deemed manipu-
lative.02 By contrast, when a court concludes that an acquisition
was motivated by bona fide business considerations, as may have
been the case in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,203 it should reject
a claim of manipulation. The issue in a section 14(e) case will not
be whether the directors had a pecuniary interest in the transac-
tion or whether any reasonable purpose can be attributed to the
directors' decision, but on the federal question of whether the di-
rectors acted with the requisite manipulative intent.
3. Sales of Assets or Stock
Similarly, whether sales by target companies of assets or of
stock constitute manipulation would seem to depend upon the in-
tent behind and effect of such sales. If a target company sells some
of its assets or issues previously authorized stock in a transaction
negotiated at arm's length that the company intends to further
some legitimate corporate purpose, then manipulation has not oc-
curred even if the transaction causes a tender offeror to abandon
or modify its offer. Section 14(e) should not require a target com-
pany to forego commercially attractive transactions simply because
a tender offer for its stock is in progress.04
200. See Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) S 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (pre-Santa Fe opinion holding that target
company violated § 14(e) by acquiring company engaged in antitrust litigation with tender
offeror).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
202. Crouse-Hind's original agreement to acquire Belden, however, was not manipula-
tive under § 14(e) because it was not motivated by a desire to block a tender offer and was
not entered into in connection with a tender offer. Cf. David J. Steinberg, Ltd. v. The Chil-
dren's Place, Inc., No. 6685 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1982) (temporary restraining order issued
against cash merger if approved because of vote of shares sold to acquiring company).
203. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); see supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
204. In GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980) the target
company agreed to sell a wholly-owned subsidiary, which the tender offeror apparently
viewed as one of the target's most attractive assets, to a third party. The sale, however,
occurred after the target company had asked several companies to bid for the subsidiary.
Moreover, the price was fair. The court held that by selling the subsidiary the target corn-
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On the other hand, if a target company issues stock under cir-
cumstances that suggest no need to raise capital or issues stock
subject to conditions-such as short-term redemption require-
ments-that suggest the sale serves some other purpose, or sells
stock or assets in a transaction negotiated with a white knight
before the white knight launches its competitive bid, a court
should investigate closely the possibility that the transaction is
manipulative. If a court determines that the transaction was
designed to artificially influence the tender offer market for the
target company's shares, then the court should grant equitable re-
lief designed to annul the manipulative effects of the
transaction.0o
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar0 6 illustrates the difficult questions
that courts face when reviewing these transactions. Whittaker
made a cash tender offer of $27 per share for forty-nine percent of
the stock of Brunswick Corp. and announced its intention to ac-
quire the remainder of Brunswick through a merger in which it
would issue debentures valued at $26 to $27 per share for each
Brunswick share.20 7 Shortly thereafter, Brunswick arranged to sell
pany's directors did not violate any fiduciary obligation that they owed to the company's
shareholders. In this case the sale did not deter the offeror, which continued its offer and
eventually acquired the target-and thus the proceeds of the sale of the previously desired
subsidiary.
205. The approach recommended by this Article would support the results reached in
Applied Digital Data Systems v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(enjoining as manipulative sale of 15.5% of target company's stock to a white knight that
nullified the ability of the first offeror to consummate tax-free exchange offer) and Consoli-
dated Amusement Co. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,584
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1978) (enjoining sham sale of securities of target company). Cf. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting temporary
restraining order against implementation of "scorched earth policy" by directors of target
company).
A stock sale to an acquiring company prior to a proposed merger would not violate
§ 14(e) because it would not be "in connection with a tender offer." If, however, the target
company or white knight contemplates a three stage transaction-lock-up stock sale,
"friendly" tender offer, and clean-up merger-a court should deem manipulative the stock
sale designed to deter competing bids from unwanted suitors. See Freund & Easton, The
Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34
Bus. LAW. 1679 (1979). Fraiden and Franco maintain that a three stage transaction may lead
a potential acquiring company to increase the price it is prepared to offer. See Fraiden &
Franco, supra note 3, at 822-23. A more likely result, however, is that an economically ra-
tional offeror will lower its bid if it can put into place arrangements that increase the chance
its bid will succeed. See Hochman, The Marathon Case, supra note 11.
206. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,483 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25,
1982), aff'd sub nom. Whittaker v. Brunswick Corp., No. 82-1305 (7th Cir. 1982).
207. Whittaker first proposed to complete the merger with preferred stock that ana-
lysts said would be worth less than $26.50. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 18, col. 8. Whittaker
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its Sherwood medical subsidiary-which investors generally viewed
as the segment of Brunswick's business that was most attractive to
Whittaker-to American Home Products (AHP) for $425 million
in a two-step transaction. First, AHP was to make a cash tender
offer of $30 for 14,166,666 Brunswick shares-sixty-four percent of
the outstanding Brunswick shares-for a total price of $425 mil-
lion. Then AHP was to purchase Sherwood from Brunswick with
the shares it hoped to acquire. If AHP was not able to acquire the
desired number of shares, it had the option of paying cash to
Brunswick.2 08 The court rejected Whittaker's claim that Bruns-
wick's sale of Sherwood was manipulative within the meaning of
Marathon. The sale did not create an artificial ceiling on the
tender offer market for Brunswick shares nor was it "expressly
designed solely for the purpose of completely blocking normal,
healthy market activity .... ,20 The court pointed out that the
sale resulted in Brunswick receiving more for Sherwood than the
value Whittaker placed on Sherwood. Thus, the transaction "might
actually be characterized as part of healthy market activity
,1210
The court's conclusion that the sale of Sherwood was not ma-
nipulative appears reasonable. The arrangement did not deny
Brunswick shareholders a choice; they could choose to accept
Whittaker's offer, proceed to approve the second-step merger and
receive about $27 per share for all of their shares, or they could sell
sixty-four percent of their shares to AHP for $30 per share and
retain their ownership interest in the remainder of Brunswick's as-
sets.2  Moreover, Whittaker was not frozen out of the bidding be-
subsequently offered $30 principal amount 16% debenture for each Brunswick share. Wall
St. J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 50, col. 1.
208. Brunswick had been offered $450 million cash for Sherwood, but found the AHP
offer more attractive because it would not result in income taxable to Brunswick. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1982 at D1, col. 5. Recent changes in the Internal Revenue Code eliminate
this tax advantage. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
209. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. at
92,832. The court continued: "A sale of a substantial asset by a corporation in the face of a
hostile tender offer standing alone is not a violation of section 14(e)." Id.
210. Id.
211. This choice, however, may have been more ephemeral than real. Brunswick's
shareholders faced a "prisoner's dilemma." See Gilson, supra note 15, at 859-62. While all
shareholders would have received about $27 if the two-part Whittaker offer had succeeded,
a majority was likely to accept AHP's $30 bid for 64% of the shares. If AHP succeeded,
non-tendering shareholders would be left with Brunswick stock valued at $15-$16 per share.
The average received by all Brunswick shareholders, under this scenario--which ultimately
eventuated-would be less than $25 per share-$30 x .64 = $19.20 plus $16 x .36 = $5.76,
or a total of $24.96. Nonetheless, one cannot say accurately that the activities of Bruns-
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cause it could have bid more than $425 million for Sherwood, if it
had believed that Sherwood was worth a higher price.212 Bruns-
wick's defense succeeded not because it was manipulative, but be-
cause AHP placed a higher value on Sherwood than did Whittaker
and because Whittaker did not have access to sufficient funds to
increase the cash portion of its offer.213
4. Options to Purchase Stock or Assets
The courts generally should view target company decisions to
grant options to white knights or third parties somewhat more
skeptically than they do outright sales. When the target company
grants an option, it generally will receive no more than minimal
compensation and will not be able to ensure that the grantee ever
will exercise the option, while the grantee often will receive valua-
ble rights without making any substantial commitment of re-
sources. Certain options, such as the options granted in Marathon,
clearly are manipulative. Other instances are likely to present
closer cases.
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn214 illustrates one of these closer
situations. Marshall Field faced a possible take-over by the Icahn
group, which had acquired about thirty percent of Marshall Field's
stock through open market purchases. To counter this possibility,
Marshall Field initiated a search for a white knight. Eventually,
Marshall Field induced BATUS, Inc. to make a cash tender offer
for fifty-one percent of Marshall Field. BATUS and Marshall Field
entered into a second-step merger agreement and a number of an-
cillary agreements in connection with this tender offer. One agree-
ment conferred on BATUS a right of first refusal for the purchase
of properties constituting Marshall Field's Chicago Division, good
for one year after any termination of the BATUS-Marshall Field
merger agreement. The arrangement also allowed BATUS to pay
for these properties with Marshall Field stock valued at BATUS's
cost.2 15 The grant of the first refusal right may be manipulative
wick's directors in approving this arrangement artificially affected the tender offer market.
But see Hochman, A Hostile Tender Offer: Does It Suspend Rules?, supra note 11, at 25
(criticizing court's opinion on these grounds).
212. The court implied that it would have found that Brunswick engaged in manipula-
tion if Brunswick had rejected an offer from Whittaker to purchase Sherwood for more than
AHP offered to pay. See supra text accompanying note 200.
213. See Wall St. J., March 9, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
214. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,616 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 1982).
215. The only Marshall Field stock BATUS was likely to own was stock it had agreed
to purchase directly from Marshall Field. Id. at 93,060.
1126 [Vol. 35:1087
DEFENSIVE RESPONSES
under section 14(e) because it placed BATUS in the preferred po-
sition of being the only party that could acquire Marshall Field
and then be entirely free to dispose of its Chicago Division proper-
ties within one year.218 The court, however, rejected Icahn's claim
that the agreement was manipulative, and pointed out that the
first refusal right did not bar sale of the properties nor grant
BATUS the right to purchase them for less than fair market value.
The court noted that Marshall Field and BATUS had clarified
their agreement to ensure that Field could reopen the bidding for
any property if BATUS elected to exercise its first refusal right.2 1
More importantly, the court concluded that the existence of the
first refusal right is "mostly unlikely to dissuade competitors...
from tendering for control of Field."2 18 Thus, the right was distin-
guishable from the options ruled manipulative in Marathon and
did not fall within the prohibition of section 14(e).
The court's conclusion in Marshall Field is reasonable. Not
every arrangement that places one tender offeror in a preferred po-
sition is manipulative. Some concept analogous to materiality
should enter into the court's calculus: section 14(e) should bar only
those arrangements that seem likely to serve as substantial deter-
rents to competing offers.21 9 Marathon does not suggest otherwise.
Thus, the court's denunciation of Marathon in Marshall Field was
unnecessary as well as faulty.
2 20
216. If the Icahn group gained control of Marshall Field, the group might sell those
properties to recover the cost of financing its acquisition of Marshall Field stock. See Wall
St. J., Feb. 23, 1982, at 48, col. 6.
217. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 93,060. Apparently
the purchaser would be given an opportunity to raise its offer, at which point BATUS again
would have an opportunity to match the offered price.
218. Id. When BATUS raised its tender offer to $30 per common share, and then
agreed to pay $30 per common share in a second-step merger, the Icaln group dropped its
opposition to the BATUS tender offer and merger. Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1982 at 44.
219. Cf. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (under rule 14a-9 an omit-
ted fact is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote).
220. The court stated:
Apart from the absence of proof of harm, Icahn's contentions rest on a questionable
legal theory. Icahn relies solely on Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp. [sic] .... I
doubt that decision represents the law in this circuit. In my view the reasoning of that
decision could unduly interfere with the right of company management to combat a
takeover attempt that it believes in good faith to be harmful to its shareholders. In my
view the securities laws do not bar management from taking [such] action .




The most common arrangements between target companies
and white knights are idemnification arrangements whereby the
target company agrees to indemnify the white knight for the losses
it may incur if its efforts to gain control of the target company fail.
Advocates of these arrangements often justify them as necessary to
induce a white knight to enter the contest for control of the target,
desirable from the point of view of the target's shareholders, and
not dissimilar to indemnification agreements that corporations
enter into in a variety of other contexts.2 1 A per se rule classifying
as manipulative all arrangements designed to place one bidder in a
preferred position would bar these indemnification agreements,
since only the white knight would be in a position to make a
tender offer without bearing the burden of paying another offeror's
costs. If, however, section 14(e) bars as manipulative only those ar-
rangements that operate as substantial deterrents to competing
bids, then at least it should not proscribe straightforward indemni-
fication agreements.2 2 Transaction costs associated with tender of-
fers, while often substantial when viewed in absolute terms, rarely
amount to more than a very small proportion of acquisition costs.
A rule allowing indemnification, however, should not become a
license for use of other defensive arrangements that arguably serve
the purpose of allowing an unsuccessful white knight to recover its
transaction costs. In particular, granting a white knight an option
to purchase a substantial number of target company shares may
have the effect of allowing the white knight to cover its costs if
another offeror tops the bid. This alternative, however, is not di-
rectly proportional to the costs a white knight is likely to incur
and, thus, is likely to have more significant manipulative effects.
Therefore, a court should not treat an option grant as an accept-
able substitute for a straightforward indemnification arrangement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions support the view that an ar-
rangement designed to interfere significantly with the forces of
supply and demand in the tender offer market properly is termed
manipulative for purposes of section 14(e). Specifically, Ernst &
Ernst and Santa Fe, as well as the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Car-
221. See, e.g., Fraidin & Franco, supra note 3.
222. See Hochman, supra note 211.
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gill, support interpreting the language of section 14(e) to prohibit
these arrangements. This interpretation of the statute advances
the purposes of the Williams Act as the Court described those pur-
poses in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries and Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Co. Moreover, the policy considerations set out in part IV of
Santa Fe do not prohibit interpreting section 14(e) in this fashion.
Judicial utilization of the approach to defining manipulation
suggested by this Article should have a constructive effect on the
tender offer process and on corporate governance generally. By fo-
cusing on the need to protect the target company shareholders'
right to obtain the benefits of an open, competitive auction market
for their shares, the federal courts should be able to block arrange-
ments intended to artificially impede the operation of market
forces without unduly constraining target company managements
from entering into legitimate business transactions.

